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This article establishes an economic framework to identify the conditions under which
an optimizing agent may seek (or not seek) to engage in costly dissonance reduction.
We set up a dynamic model of decision-making in which the individual’s mind is
composed of a coordinating principal and 2 conﬂicting agents. We take into account the
cognitive dissonance experienced as a result of the conﬂict between the agents. Each
agent (or self) is specialized in perceiving a particular type of signal and performing a
task. Dissonance levels in our model are not constant. Instead, the individual’s split-
selves are open to habituation, which can lead to a reduction in cognitive dissonance.
Therefore, motivated habituation appears as a way to avoid dissonance. We prove the
existence of an optimal strategy with a threshold structure. Our results show that the
existence of intrapersonal conﬂict may be a long run phenomenon even in an optimiz-
ing mind.
Keywords: action-based theory, cognitive dissonance, habituation, mind hierarchy, modularity of
mind, stochastic dynamic programming
In this article we seek to investigate the de-
cision-making behavior of an individual whose
choices are partially constrained by cognitive
dissonance. Our research questions are as fol-
lows: (i) What is the behavior induced by an
optimizing mind in a dynamic setting in which
there are states of the world that cause cognitive
dissonance and correspondingly a fall in deci-
sion-making performance? (ii) What is the evo-
lution of cognitive dissonance on an optimal
decision path? and (iii) What are the factors that
affect the dissonance reduction decision of an
optimizing mind?
A motivation for our study stems from the
observation that stress and tension attributable
to conﬂicting beliefs or actions are experienced
more frequently, repetitively, and over a longer
horizon than one would expect (see Mahaffy,
1996; Zhou, 2000; Fischbacher and Heusi,
2008; Gino, Ayal and Ariely, 2009; Gino, Nor-
ton and Ariely, 2010; Garvey, 2012). Given that
cognitive dissonance is not a pleasant state and
individuals try to avoid it, the above-mentioned
observation raises a question: Can long-run dis-
sonance (or living with dissonance as men-
tioned in Mahaffy, 1996; Zhou, 2000; Garvey,
2012 and as living in contradiction in Margolin,
1997) be optimal? If it is, which factors have an
impact on the long run (optimal) level of con-
ﬂict an individual bears in the mind? What is the
inﬂuence and the role of habituation on the
evolution of the level of intrapersonal conﬂict?1
To answer these questions, we model the mind
as a decision-making unit with a modular struc-
ture, which is aware of the dynamic and ﬂexible
aspect of the (potential) conﬂict between its
different parts and acts accordingly. In particu-
lar, it may forego higher returns in some states
1 Habituation is deﬁned as the decline of a conditioned
response after repeated exposure to the conditioned stimu-
lus. More discussion will follow in The Model.
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of the world to be able to reduce the cognitive
dissonance experienced due to the conﬂict that
occurs in some other states of the world. The
concept of habituation, which in the current
context implies that cognitive dissonance may
change as a result of being repetitively exposed
to the dissonance inducing state/signal, is a cor-
ner stone of our model. The dynamic character
of the model allows us to analyze the impact of
relevant parameters on the evolution of intrap-
ersonal conﬂict.
Our model incorporates the approach that the
mind is not a seamless unit, but rather a modu-
lar one (see Fodor, 1983; Minsky, 1986; Cos-
mides and Tooby, 1992). It has different parts/
systems in a hierarchical structure, which are
specialized in certain tasks and responsive to
only particular signals (see Fodor, 1983; Car-
ruthers, 2006; Samuels, 2006). In our model,
there is an organizing unit (the principal, resem-
bling the central system, that deals with com-
plex cognitive activities) and, for the sake of
simplicity, two different units in a lower hier-
archy (agents, resembling input systems, that
deal with basic cognitive activities). Each agent
has a comparative advantage in receiving a sig-
nal. When the signal describing the world ar-
rives, the principal assigns it to one (or in some
cases both) of the agents who then performs a
task. For our purposes, this task can be inter-
preted as a simple binary decision. If the signal
is perceived successfully, then the agent per-
forms the task, which brings a positive return
(or utility) to the individual. The reception of
the signal and the execution of the task can even
be considered together as one activity. It is
worthwhile emphasizing that cognitive disso-
nance arises only in the case of certain states of
the world, in which the information asymmetry
between (potentially) conﬂicting units/cogni-
tions vanishes, which is a difference from the
standard deﬁnition of the concept.2
The principal’s decision in each period can be
reduced to choosing one of the following ac-
tions (or choices): attempting cross-training or
acting in accordance with the agents’ special-
izations. Cross-training is a method of costly
dissonance reduction: it aims at reducing the
dissonance by exposing the agents to character-
istics of the world they do not “like” and/or are
not specialized in perceiving. There is a current
cost associated with cross-training, because it
relies on assigning a signal to an agent that is
less likely to perceive this signal. Nevertheless,
cross-training may lead to lower dissonance lev-
els in the future because it has the potential to
generate habituation. The return from cross-
training accrues in the composite state of the
world, when the principal needs both agents to
act together, which is attributable to the fact that
cognitive dissonance is felt when these two
conﬂicting agents have to act together (see
Fodor, 1983; Minsky, 1986; Brocas and Carillo,
2008a, 2008b for information encapsulation and
asymmetric information in the mind and brain).
As the reader may notice, the negative effects of
cognitive dissonance in our model are reﬂected
on task performance or effectivity of actions,
which is more in line with the action-based
theory of cognitive dissonance (Harmon-
Jones, 1999) than the standard theory of cog-
nitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). Acting in
accordance with agents’ specializations is just
assigning the signal to the agent who is spe-
cialized in it (or more likely to perceive it).
Acting in accordance with specializations
leads to a higher expected current return, but
does not reduce dissonance levels. Therefore,
there is a trade-off associated with current and
future returns.
The elements we explain above deﬁne a sto-
chastic dynamic programming problem. Solv-
ing this problem, we ﬁnd that a forward-looking
principal uses a threshold rule in deciding
whether to engage in costly cognitive disso-
nance reduction or not. An implication of this
ﬁnding is that for some parameter values, it is
not optimal to totally avoid dissonance. There-
fore, our main result implies that under certain
circumstances, which will be described in terms
of the parameters of the model, the intraper-
sonal conﬂict may remain in an optimizing
mind that is, cognitive dissonance can be a
long-run (optimal) phenomenon. Individual’s
deﬁning characteristics and observed behavior
are affected by the comparative ﬂexibility of his
different selves. The pace of habituation, the
time preference, and the frequency of the dis-
sonance inducing state are some important fac-
tors inﬂuencing the optimal decision. In partic-
2 I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising a question,
which lead to this clarifying statement.
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ular, an increase in the pace of habituation, the
discount parameter (i.e., forwardlookingness),
and the frequency of conﬂict have the same kind
of impact: they all increase the expected return
from attempting cross-training, ultimately re-
ducing the long run level of dissonance.
Most of the contributions of our model lie
in its simple yet rich behavioral structure.
First of all, to the best of our knowledge, the
model in this article is the ﬁrst dynamic
model of individual decision-making under
cognitive dissonance. Second, it is a model
that incorporates many behavioral phenomena
such as habituation, modularity of and hier-
archy in the mind, and cognitive dissonance
to an individual decision-making problem. Fi-
nally, the current study offers motivated ha-
bituation as an alternative way to avoid cog-
nitive dissonance. Some other methods that
existing literature offer are moral disengage-
ment, attitude change, motivated forgetting,
selective exposure, and denial of responsibil-
ity. Among these, motivated habituation is
closer to motivated forgetting or attitude
change. Nevertheless, it is still different from
them in that motivated habituation is an ex-
ante action taken to avoid the negative effects
of future, anticipated cognitive dissonance,
whereas the former ones are ex-post measures
that aim to avoid (current or already experi-
enced) dissonance. It is the dynamic character
of our model, which enables a method that
aims at reducing future, anticipated disso-
nance.
Literature Review
In his seminal piece, Festinger (1957) as-
serts that people experience cognitive disso-
nance when they hold inconsistent beliefs or
act contrary to their existing beliefs. Because
the tension brought by this inconsistency be-
tween different cognitions is not a pleasant
state, individuals want to avoid it.3 Aronson
(1988) and Beauvois and Joule (1996) claim
that dissonance is mainly related to the issues
of self-esteem and the desire to rationalize
one’s actions. In other words, the dissonance
and dissonance reducing behavior generally
exist when an individual’s actions or beliefs
are in conﬂict with his or her desire to be
known/seen as a good or an intelligent indi-
vidual. This argument is complementing Fest-
inger’s (1957) original theory of cognitive
dissonance in a way that it emphasizes the
main source of dissonance.
Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive disso-
nance is considered as one of the most inﬂuen-
tial theories in psychology (see Jones, 1985). It
led to thousands of articles in the last six de-
cades. Naturally, we can mention here only the
studies that are closely related to ours. This
means we focus on the ones using mathematical
techniques to model cognitive dissonance re-
duction. Shultz and Lepper (1996) develop a
computational model of cognitive dissonance,
which they call consonance model. They use
networks to model individuals’ descriptions of
decision problems: node directions and weights
refer to relationships between different cogni-
tions. Using this model they simulate data and
compare the simulated data to human behavior
in some well-known cognitive dissonance ex-
periments. A static version of our model with
only the dissonance inducing state would be
similar to a simple version of their network
model. Sakai (1999) develops a multiplicative
power-function model of cognitive dissonance.
His model can deliver predictions about the
emergence and level of cognitive dissonance.
One main difference between Sakai (1999) and
our model is that we do not model or explain the
emergence of cognitive dissonance.
Lévy-Garboua and Blondel (2002) argue
that cognitive dissonance does not presume
irrational behavior if one deﬁnes the rational-
ity notion properly under dynamic uncer-
tainty. They argue that cognitive consistency
must be the rationality notion used under dy-
namic uncertainty. Hence, a common, intui-
tive message of our article and Lévy-Garboua
and Blondel (2002) is that cognitive disso-
nance and rationality are less incompatible
than usually thought. Livnat and Pippenger
(2006) set up a game theoretical model of
evolution and show that the presence of con-
ﬂicting agents in an optimal brain is possible,
which is again in line with our main result.
3 Festinger (1957) argues “The existence of dissonance,
being psychologically uncomfortable, will motivate the per-
son to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve conso-
nance.”
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Gawronski and Kulakowski (2007) generalize
the differential equations approach used to
model cognitive dissonance in groups to con-
sider asymmetric interpersonal ties. Their
study follows a Heiderian approach to cogni-
tive dissonance in social groups (see Heider,
1946). Their numerical results show that un-
der certain circumstances, it may take arbi-
trarily long time to avoid intragroup disso-
nance. Along similar lines with Shultz and
Lepper (1996) and Sakai (1999), Sakai (2013)
proposes a recurrent network model of cog-
nitive consistency to unify Heider’s balance
theory with Festinger’s cognitive dissonance
theory. One common difference between our
article and most of the articles mentioned
above is that we solve our model analytically
whereas the others come up with computa-
tional solutions and simulations.
The optimization approach and dynamic
mathematical models are more widespread in
economics. On the other hand, research on
cognitive dissonance in economics started
more than two decades after Festinger (1957).
The ﬁrst article in economics that deals with
possible economic consequences of cognitive
dissonance is Akerlof and Dickens (1982).
Their model predicts not only how given in-
formation is interpreted, but also whether that
information is to be received or not according
to their preferences. With the cognitive dis-
sonance approach, they can explain the effec-
tivity of noninformational advertising, the
popularity of social security legislation, and
safety legislation and the failure of people in
purchasing actuarially beneﬁcial ﬂood and
earthquake insurance. Dickens (1986), Gilad
et al. (1987), Rabin (1994), Brady et al.
(1995), Konow (2000), Oxoby (2003), Gold-
smith et al. (2004), Balestrino and Ciardi
(2008), Johansson-Stenman and Svedsäter
(2008), Bendersky and Curhan (2009), Lester
and Young (2009), Smith (2009), Ishida
(2010), Dickinson and Oxoby (2011), and
Matthey and Regner (2011) are some other
articles that use cognitive dissonance to ex-
plain certain economic phenomena or behav-
ior such as criminal behavior, sunk cost fal-
lacy, status-seeking behavior, labor supply
responses to discrimination, ultimatum game
offers, negotiation behavior, principal–agent
relationships, timing of marriage, pessimism,
other-regarding behavior, and behavioral
spillover effects.
Epstein and Kopylov (2006), to the best of
our knowledge, is the only axiomatic study of
cognitive dissonance in decision theory. These
authors model self-justiﬁcation of past deci-
sions. Axioms are deﬁned on preferences over
ex-ante actions (modeled formally by menus).
The representation of these preferences admits
the interpretation that the agent adjusts beliefs
after taking an action so as to be more optimistic
about its possible consequences. Since the ac-
tion has already been taken, no adjustment can
be made on it. Therefore, the individual adjusts
his or her beliefs taking actions as given. Brocas
and Carillo (2008a, 2008b) and Alonso, Brocas,
and Carillo (2011) model brain activity and
provide neuroeconomic foundations for variety
of behavior. Our article is comparable, in its
nature, to these last few studies more than the
others in economics mentioned above in the
sense that our primary goal, as well, is modeling
a behavioral phenomenon (e.g., dissonance re-
duction) rather than using it to explain an eco-
nomic phenomena.
To summarize, the current article lies at the
intersection of psychology and economics in
that it aims to explain a psychological phenom-
enon with mathematical techniques frequently
used in economics. What makes our model dif-
ferent from earlier studies mentioned above is
its dynamic and rich structure, both of which
enable us to analyze the effects of some param-
eters relevant for costly dissonance avoidance
and offer motivated habituation as a resolution
strategy.
The Model
In this section, we present our model and
explain each modeling assumption by referring
to relevant studies in the literature.
Modularity of Mind
Our model of decision-making in the human
mind stems from ideas and ﬁndings in two
literatures. Findings in neuroscience and cogni-
tive science literature suggest that the mind is
not a seamless unit. Rather, it is composed of
semi-autonomous parts each of which is special-
ized in receiving certain signals and performing
certain tasks. This implies modularity of the
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mind in cognitive activity. One of the major
points Minsky’s (1986) Society of Mind makes
is this collective but specialized structure of
human mind. Fodor (1983); Cosmides and
Tooby (1987), Sperber (1994), Pinker (1997),
Shettleworth (1998), and Carruthers (2006) are
some other prominent proponents of the modu-
lar mind argument.
A well-known example in neuroscience is
attributable to McClure et al. (2004), reporting
that the limbic system responds more to imme-
diate gratiﬁcation whereas the cortical system
responds to longer-term beneﬁts. Sergent and
Signoret (1992); Charman and Baron-Cohen
(1995), Miller and Cohen (2001), Geary and
Huffman (2002), Poldrack and Rodriguez
(2004), and Bechara (2005) are some other neu-
roscientiﬁc studies reporting on the modularity
of (or compartmentalization in) brain. Finally,
Livnat and Pippenger (2006) and Bisin and
Iantchev (2010) present evolutionary arguments
in favor of modularity.
To summarize, the modularity of mind (or
brain) is a prominent approach embraced in
cognitive psychology, evolutionary psychology,
and neuroscience literature.4 In economics, the
multiple-selves approach, which is in line with
this phenomenon, has been used extensively in
recent years. People have different traits, inner
selves, or characteristics that are specialized in
different signals, tasks, and responsive to dif-
ferent types of urges.
Hierarchical Structure
Another important ﬁnding that is relevant for
our model is that there is a hierarchy in the
mind. Some systems or parts have superior po-
sitions in this decision-making hierarchy (see
Hughlings-Jackson, 1959; Duncan and Owen,
2000; Botvinick et al., 2001; Miller and Cum-
mings, 2007; Badre and D’Esposito, 2007). Ac-
cordingly, we assume that there is a governing
unit, the principal, and two semi-autonomous
agents embedded in the mind. This is also sim-
ilar to the central system versus input systems in
Fodor (1983), planner-doer interpretation in
Thaler and Shefrin (1981) and Bénabou and
Pycia (2002), cognitive system versus affective
system in Brocas and Carillo (2008a). The hier-
archical and modular structure described in
Minsky (1986), Oatley (1986), and Blakeslee
(2005) are also in line with our model. More
recently, Alonso, Brocas, and Carillo (2011)
propose a principal–agent model of brain where
a coordinator (i.e., a principal) allocates limited
resources (e.g., oxygen, glucose) to brain sys-
tems responsible for different tasks. The prin-
cipal in our model has a higher position in the
hierarchy compared to the agents and deals with
a more complex problem of optimal task assign-
ment. We denote the risk-neutral principal as P
and agents as Ai, i  1, 2.
States of the World and Specialization
In our model there are signals that partition
the information space, that is, describe the states
of the world. States of the world are character-
istics of the world.5 For instance, they can be
interpreted as different aspects or characteristics
of a unique physical state of the world. For
simplicity, we assume that there are two pure
characteristics of the world, denoted by Sj 
{S1, S2} that can be described by signals. Sig-
nals are deﬁned on the power set of these char-
acteristics.
We denote signals by sj, where originally sj
{s1, s2, s3, s4}. The possible signals are as
follows:
s s1 ¡ {s1} xS2,
s s2 ¡ S1x{s2},
s s3 {s1, s2} ¡ {s1} x{s2}, and
s s4 ⁄0 ¡ S1xS2
where the ﬁrst case corresponds to receiving a
signal that gives information only about S1, the
second one corresponds to receiving a signal
that gives information only about S2, the third
one implies that the signal received gives infor-
mation about both S1 and S2, and the last one
implies that the signal received gives informa-
tion about neither S1 nor S2.
4 An alternative theory of mind (the so called domain-
general processing theory of mind) stipulates that mind is not
modular, the mental activity is distributed across mind in a
complex fashion and cannot be decomposed into separate
units. William Uttal is the major proponent of this approach
(see Uttal, 2002; Uttal, 2003). In this article, we adopt the
modular mind approach proposed by Fodor (1983) and Minsky
(1986).
5 Therefore, we do not use the term state of the world to
refer to different virtual states of the world.
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Each agent Ai (i  1, 2) has a comparative
advantage in perceiving one pure signal sj,
where j  1, 2. The specialization (or the com-
parative advantage) is associated with agents’
perception quality. Agent Ai perceives the sig-
nal that he is specialized in with probability p
and the signal that he is not specialized in with
probability P, where P¯  P  1 and P¯  P.
These modeling assumptions are also compati-
ble with some ﬁndings in neuroscience, which
stipulate that different brain systems perform
different and sometimes incompatible tasks and
a selection should be made among competing
systems (see Zeki et al., 1991; Watson et al.,
1993; Kanwisher et al., 1997; Berridge and
Robinson, 2003; Dityatev et al., 2010).
In each period t, a signal arrives P, which is
then assigned by P to A1, A2 or both. By assign-
ing the signal, the principal uses one (or both) of
the agents in the decision-making. Here, we do
not model the task explicitly: it can be inter-
preted as making a simple decision given the
signal in the current period. If the signal is
successfully perceived, the task will be per-
formed successfully, which brings a ﬁnite, real-
valued return of  (or  	 , in the case of a
composite signal) to the individual; if the agent
who is delegated cannot perceive the signal
successfully, then he cannot perform the task
successfully, which leads to 0 return for the
individual. Returns can be interpreted as any
kind of beneﬁts from the successful completion
of the task. They can be material returns or
utilities in general.
Cognitive Dissonance
The cognitive dissonance comes into the pic-
ture in the case of a composite signal, s3. The
composite signal describes two different aspects
of the world, which in turn requires both agents
to act together. Without both of them perform-
ing, the task in s3 cannot be successfully com-
pleted. However, because these two agents are
in conﬂict with each other, their simultaneous
involvement creates a cognitive dissonance,
which inﬂuences individual returns negatively
(see Baumeister, 2003; Elster, 2004 for a similar
phenomena between cognitive system and af-
fective system).6 In our model, cognitive disso-
nance that is due to agent Ai is denoted as 
i. 
i
(i  1, 2) takes values in [0, ].
While we are describing this modular struc-
ture found in scientiﬁc research, we would also
like to mention the possibility of conﬂict among
different parts of the brain. Conﬂicting interests
of different parts of the mind/brain is also a
well-documented phenomenon in neuroscience
and psychology. Among all, Mischel et al.
(1989), Tversky and Shaﬁr (1992), McClure et
al. (2004), Bechara (2005), and Camerer et al.
(2005) are some studies that report on the exis-
tence of a conﬂict between different mental and
neural systems. In a theoretical study, Livnat
and Pippenger (2006) argue that optimal brain
system, which is designed for a sole purpose,
can have agents that are in conﬂict with each
other. The conﬂict reported in these studies is
one of the cornerstones of our model. It is the
existence of this conﬂict that leads to cognitive
dissonance.
Costs of Intrapersonal Conﬂict
A phenomenon, which is directly related to
conﬂict and cognitive dissonance, is the tension
and the corresponding fall in performance.
Conﬂicting cognitions have the potential to
prevent individual from behaving effectively
(see Jones and Gerard, 1967; Spadafore,
1976; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Baumeister,
2003; Harmon-Jones, Amodio and Harmon-
Jones, 2009; Gawronski, 2012). This modeling
assumption is also in conformity with the action-
based model of cognitive dissonance, which
suggests that the presence of cognitive disso-
nance may lead to ineffective and/or conﬂicted
actions (see Harmon-Jones, Amodio and Har-
mon-Jones, 2009; Gawronski, 2012; Harmon-
Jones, 2012, and references therein) and hence a
fall in performance.
A simple and useful example comes from a
well-known psychological test, the Stroop test
6 The cognitive dissonance that can be experienced as
a result of the conﬂict of decisions made in different
periods is not the focus of this article. Gur and Sack-
heim’s (1979) deﬁnition of self-deception as a motivated
act is an appropriate explanation for this phenomenon.
The fact that some brain areas (including consciousness)
may be unaware of information to which other brain areas
respond is a well-established phenomenon in neurosci-
ence (see Berns et al., 1997 and Whalen et al., 1998).
This kind of cognitive dissonance may also be reduced by
what is called in the literature as motivated forgetting or
selective memory.
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named after John Ridley Stroop: Blakeslee
(2005) analyzes the nature of hypnosis and sug-
gestion on subjects’ decision-making perfor-
mance in a psychological experiment. Subjects
are shown cards on which there are colored
writings and asked to press a button to tell the
color of the writing. The trick in the experiment
is that writings conﬂict with the colors; for
example, the word “blue” is written in red or
“yellow” is written in green. In this experiment,
it has been observed that subjects sometimes
spend some time to tell the color and sometimes
even tell the wrong color. Apparently, the color
signal and the word signal create a conﬂict in
the brain. This is called the Stroop effect. She
reports that hypnosis and suggestion stop this
conﬂict by suppressing the parts of the brain
that is responsible for reading and detecting
conﬂict. Aside from the hypnosis part, the con-
ﬂict and the Stroop effect in her study are very
much related to the structure of our model. The
very existence of conﬂict among different cog-
nitions has a potential to reduce the task perfor-
mance or decision quality.
In our model, the corresponding fall in re-
turns attributable to cognitive dissonance of 
i is
denoted as i(
i). We assume that i(.) is a
continuous, increasing, and concave function.
We normalize i(0) to be 0. Moreover, i
  .
Before we describe the cross-training phase
and the value function, we present the timeline
of events below (see Figure 1).
Habituation and Cross-Training Attempts
The motivation for incorporating the cross-
training phase into the model comes from a
psychological phenomenon called habituation.
The term habituation in the psychology litera-
ture refers to the decline of a conditioned re-
sponse following repeated exposure to the con-
ditioned stimulus. Some examples would be as
follows:
• When a subject in an experiment is given
an electric shock repetitively with the same
magnitude, the experimenter needs to in-
crease the magnitude of the shock to get a
response that is equivalent to the one at the
beginning.
• Old people who react to social changes,
fashion, and the habits of a new generation
start to get used to them if they are frequently
exposed to these phenomena.
• An individual who thinks that lying is not
a good behavioral trait may feel less disso-
nance if he occasionally has to lie in his new
job.
Habituation is a type of defense mechanism
for the individual to avoid the unpleasant
feeling he or she experiences. The reason is
the tension that occurs in the case of disso-
nance. If a particular action/belief/cognition
is in contradiction with some other and is
comparatively more crucial for the individual,
he or she needs to adjust the latter one ac-
cordingly so that he or she feels less disso-
nance. Habituation may take place con-
sciously or unconsciously.
Habituation is an important part of our model
because it creates a trade-off for the individual
between current and future returns, making
principal’s decision problem a dynamic one.
The effect of habituation is observed on disso-
nance levels, that is, 
i, i 1, 2. 
is are discrete,
one-to-one, and bounded functions of success-
ful crosstraining attempts in the model. If an
agent is loaded with the signal that he is not
specialized in (i.e., cross-trained) and if he per-
ceives the signal successfully, it decreases his cog-
nitive dissonance that he experiences in the com-
posite state. Hence, for all i,
i
ni
	 0 at each
point (where ni is the number of successful cross-
training attempts) except when 
i  0. Moreover,
we assume that the zero lower bound can be
reached with ﬁnitely many successful cross-
training attempts.
In the composite state, the principal needs
both agents to be able to perform the task suc-
cessfully and when both agents act together in
the same time period on the same task, they
experience cognitive dissonance attributable to
their awareness of the “other,” which otherwise
does not happen because of the information
asymmetries prevalent (see Berns et al., 1997;Figure 1. Timeline of events.
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Rauch et al., 1997; Knowlton et al., 1996 for
neuroscientiﬁc evidence for asymmetric infor-
mation in the brain and Fodor, 1983 for infor-
mation encapsulation, resembling asymmetric
information, as a necessity for a modular mind).
We assume that cognitive dissonance is experi-
enced only in the case of successful completion
of the task, which requires perception of both
parts of the composite signal. In a sense, suc-
cessful perception of the signal by one agent
guarantees the other agent’s awareness of the
agent’s active involvement.
The possibility of reducing cognitive dis-
sonance in composite states raises a question
for the principal: cross-training or acting in
accordance with agents’ specializations? The
probability of receiving signal sj, where j  1,
2, 3 is independent and identical across time
and equal to Fj  1/3, for all j  1, 2, 3.7
Therefore, the principal should decide
whether to act in accordance with specializa-
tions or attempt cross-training, when he re-
ceives the signal sj, j  1, 2.
It is necessary—for clariﬁcation—to make
a distinction between the cognitive disso-
nance experienced when the agent attempts
cross-training and the cognitive dissonance
experienced in the presence of a composite
signal. The former one is endogenous, that is,
cognitive dissonance is intentionally chosen
to be experienced, whereas the latter is exog-
enous, that is, not chosen by the agent. In the
former, the negative effect of dissonance
takes the form of a fall in perception quality,
whereas in the latter it takes the form of an
explicit fall in the return.8
Motivated habituation in our model has an
investment character, and examples for such
behavior can be observed in real life instances
in which an individual–anticipating future dis-
sonance-inducing states of the world and a cor-
responding fall in returns he is likely to expe-
rience–tries to reduce the dissonance he will
have by exposing his split selves to dissonance-
inducing signals.
Having described the important notions in the
model, below we deﬁne the individual’s value
function.
The Value Function
The expected current returns levels under dif-
ferent signals and assignments are presented
below in Table 1 for the reader to be able to
follow easily. For instance, the ﬁrst cell can be
read as the expected return if s1 is assigned to
Ai, who is specialized in s1.9
Now, we can write the principal’s value func-
tion. The principal’s problem at each period is
to determine which agent(s) he should assign
the signal/task in the given state:
V( j, 1, 2)
 maxP¯
EVmaxj, 1 , 2,P
EVminj, 1 , 2 , if j
 1, 2 (1)
7 Because the signal that does not describe any charac-
teristic of the world (i.e., s4  /0) is not operational in any
sense, we assumed F4  0.
8 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this
important distinction.
9 We assume that for a singleton signal such as sj, j  1,
2, the decision is between deciding in accordance with
specializations and attempting cross-training. This is more
of a simplifying assumption to keep the model tractable.
Neither will it bring additional insights nor would our main
result qualitatively change (only the cross-training will take
shorter time) if we relax this assumption.
Table 1
Immediate Returns
Ai specialized in s1 Ai specialized in s2 Both Agents
s1 P.
  1  P.0 P¯.
  1  P¯.0 NA
s2 P.
  1  P.0 P¯.
  1  P¯.0 NA
s3 0 0 P¯ P¯  PP.  P¯P¯11  22
22 KARAGÖZOG˘ LU
V( j, 1, 2)  max
(P¯P¯)( [1(1)2(2)])EVNNj, 1 , 2,
0EVYNj, 1 , 2,
0EVYNj, 1 , 2,
(PP)( [1(1)2(2)])EVYYj, 1 , 2
	, if j 3
given i(ni) for i 1, 2,
(2)
where Vmax refers to next period’s value func-
tion when the task in the current state j is
assigned to the agent specialized in state j and
Vmin refers to next period’s value function
when the task in the current state j is assigned
to the agent not specialized in state j. When
j  3, there are four different options for the
principal:
• assigning in accordance with specializa-
tions for both signals,
• cross-training A1 and not cross-training A2,
• not cross-training A1 and cross-training A2,
and
• cross-training both A1 and A2.
Subscripts NN, YN, NY, and YY correspond
to these options, respectively. In YN and NY,
because one of the signals is not assigned, it
will not be perceived for sure. Therefore, the
current return is zero. Expectations in the next
period value functions are taken on j and 
is.
The reason for taking expectations on 
is is
the stochastic perceptions of agents. Other
than that, 
is follow a known deterministic
process (i.e., function of number of successful
cross-training attempts) and they take values
in [0, ] interval. Also, note that nis need not
be state variables because, given 
i(ni) func-
tions, once 
i is observed the principal knows
the value of 
i(ni  1). The fact that 
i(ni) are
one-to-one functions is useful here.
The Optimal Solution
The two lemmas below provide some prelim-
inary results to be used in the main theorem.
The ﬁrst lemma suggests that there exists a
certain time period, after which there is no
expected future beneﬁts from cross-training,
which implies that the principal decides solely
based on agents’ specializations.
Lemma 1
The probability that there exists a ﬁnite pe-
riod T  1 after which “acting in accordance
with specializations” is the unique optimal ac-
tion for all t  T is 1.
Proof
See Appendix.
The lemma below suggests that there is no
reason to wait for cross-training if there are
expected future beneﬁts from doing so.
Lemma 2
It is not optimal to attempt to cross-train Ai in
the future, if it is not optimal now.
Proof
See Appendix.
The following theorem presents our main re-
sult. It encapsulates that the optimal decision
rule for the principal has a threshold structure.
Theorem 1
Given the stochastic dynamic programming
problem in (1) and (2), the optimal decision rule
has the following threshold structure with cru-
cial values of 
i, that is, 
 i, for i  1, 2:
• Attempt cross-training in state j  1, 2 if

i  
 i where agent i is the one, not specialized
in state j and
• Act in accordance with specializations if

i  
 i.
The difﬁculty of solving the stochastic dy-
namic programming problem given above
stems from the fact that the evolution of the
stochastic processes in the future depends on the
current decision. Therefore, it is not a stationary
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stochastic dynamic programming problem that
can be solved easily by equating the expected
returns that are due to different decisions to
each other. However, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2
stated above are useful in proving this result.
The facts we exploit are (i) after ﬁnitely many
periods, the problem becomes a stationary
one with probability 1 (see Lemma 1) and (ii)
postponing cross-training when it is possible
in the current period is not an optimal action
(Lemma 2).
Proof
See Appendix.
The intuition for this result comes from a
simple cost–beneﬁt analysis. Basically, what
the principal does is compare the expected costs
and beneﬁts of each action at each point in time.
We show that there will be a ﬁnite time period
after which incurring the (expected) current
costs of cross-training is not expected to pay
sufﬁciently in the future. This is determined by
the level of cognitive dissonances and the pro-
cess governing them along with other parame-
ters of the model. When crosstraining becomes
an unattractive option, the principal starts to
make decisions solely based on specializations
of the agents.
The following corollary, which presents the
main message of the article, follows from
Theorem 1.
Corollary 1
Cognitive dissonance (intrapersonal conﬂict)
can be a long-run phenomenon in an optimizing
mind.
Proof
Directly follows from Theorem 1.
If it is not worth reducing the intrapersonal
conﬂict to zero, the individual continues to feel
the tension in every instance where he needs to
use both selves in a decision-making problem.
Our result is consistent with the ﬁndings of
Williams and Aaker (2002), who experimen-
tally show that mixed/conﬂicting emotions may
peacefully coexist (especially in individuals
with higher propensity to accept duality) and
Livnat and Pippenger (2006), who theoretically
show that an optimal brain can be composed of
conﬂicting parts. Our analytical result is also
consistent with Gawronski and Kulakowski
(2007), who computationally show that the
complete removal of cognitive dissonance can
take arbitrarily long time.
The following corollaries present results on
some special cases in which either one or both
of the agents are completely resistant to habit-
uation.
Corollary 2
(Fixed 
1 and 
2) If both agents are totally
resistant to habituation, that is, their dissonance
terms are constant, the principal does not at-
tempt cross-training and decides according to
the specialization of agents.
Proof
See Appendix.
This kind of situation may be observed if
an individual has very strong beliefs (or in
general cognitions), which are in conﬂict with
each other.
Corollary 3
(Fixed 
1 (
2) and variable 
2 (
1)) If agent Ai
is totally resistant to habituation, that is, his
dissonance term, ini  i0 ∀ni  , where
ni is the number of successful cross-training
attempts, then the principal does not attempt to
crosstrain Ai. This corresponds to assigning the
task in the state Ai is not specialized in to agent
Aki. On the other hand, if agent k  i is
ﬂexible (i.e., not totally resistant to habituation)
the optimal decision rule in Proposition 1 is
valid for Ak, that is, the principal assigns the
task in state Aik is specialized in to Ak until 
k
reaches 
k and then starts to assign the task to
Ai.
Proof
See Appendix.
This kind of situation may be observed if an
individual has conﬂicting cognitions, one of
which is very strong and resistant whereas the
other is not.
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Comparative Static Analyses
In this section, we conduct some comparative
static analyses and look at the impact of a
change in some important parameters of the
model on the optimal (long run) values of dis-
sonances. These parameters are the probability
of the composite state, the pace of habituation,
and the discount factor. We derive intuitive
implications from these analyses and give ex-
amples from real life.
Proposition 1
An increase in the probability of the composite
signal, F3, decreases the long run levels of cogni-
tive dissonances, that is, F3˜  F3 ) i˜ 	 i i 
1, 2.
Proof
See Appendix.
This is a very intuitive result that shares a
ﬂavor of what we also observe in our daily
lives. All it says is that people are less willing to
forego current returns by investing in something
that is not expected to pay back very frequently
in the future; or equivalently, an increase in the
frequency of future returns (holding returns per-
period ﬁxed) makes the investment more attrac-
tive. The frequency of expected future returns
has a major impact on the decision to bear the
current costs of an investment project. This
comparative static result is also parallel to the
effect of interaction frequency on balance in
Heiderian theory of balance.
Proposition 2
An increase in the rate of habituation (in-
crease in 
i
ni

 at every point) decreases the
long run levels of cognitive dissonances, that is,
i
˜ ni  ini and
˜ i
ni
	
i
ni
)˜i 	 i, i 
1, 2.
Proof
See Appendix.
The pace of habituation directly inﬂuences
the total (opportunity) cost of the investment to
be made to achieve the minimal dissonance
level. If the pace of habituation is very rapid, the
principal can achieve the minimum level of
dissonance in a few cross-training attempts,
which makes the opportunity cost very small
and hence the investment very attractive. On the
other hand, if the pace of habituation is very
slow, it will take so many attempts to achieve
the minimum level of dissonance, which leads
to a very high opportunity cost and makes the
investment unattractive.
Note that the increase in habituation rate is
the same for all Ai. If the magnitude of change
is assumed to be different among i’s, qualita-
tively the same result would hold. However, the
long run level of conﬂict would be different
depending on the relative ﬂexibility of Ai’s. The
ﬂexibility/rigidity, in a sense, is related to the
easiness (or difﬁculty) of changing/relaxing/
giving up beliefs, traits, habits and so forth As
the model implies, the more ﬂexible the split-
self, easier to cross-train him, which leads to a
lower dissonance on his side in the long run.
Proposition 3
An increase in the discount factor  decreases
the long run levels of cognitive dissonances,
that is, ˜  )˜i 	 i i  1, 2.
Proof
See Appendix.
The logic behind this result is very intuitive.
An increase in patience, implied by an increase
in , means a higher valuation for future bene-
ﬁts, which can be obtained by cross-training. To
grasp this result clearly, one may think of two
extreme type of individuals (i.e., principals in
our context) one of which is completely myopic
(i.e., with   0) and the other is perfectly
forward looking (i.e., with   1). The ﬁrst one
cares only about today, and the latter value
returns in every period equally. The ﬁrst one,
when faced with a decision after receiving a
signal sj where j  1, 2, assigns the task to the
agent specialized in that signal, and the latter
may attempt cross-training depending on the
value of 
i and other parameters.
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Conclusion
We present a dynamic model of individual
decision-making problem under cognitive
dissonance. Our model also incorporates
well-documented cognitive and psychological
phenomena such as habituation, modularity of
and hierarchy in the mind. It proposes moti-
vated habituation as an alternative method for
avoiding cognitive dissonance and identiﬁes
conditions under which an optimizing mind
seeks to engage in costly cognitive disso-
nance reduction. We conclude that under cer-
tain circumstances, an optimizing mind does
not seek dissonance reduction. Speciﬁcally,
an individual may not ﬁnd it worthwhile to
reduce the intrapersonal conﬂict he experi-
ences in some states of the world. This may
be attributable to factors such as the special-
ization levels of split-selves in different sig-
nals, resistance/openness to habituation, fre-
quency of the conﬂict inducing state, and time
preferences (i.e., forward-lookingness). Our
main result is in line with some earlier ﬁnd-
ings in the psychology literature:
• An optimizing brain may consist of con-
ﬂicting agents (see Livnat and Pippenger,
2006),
• The presence of cognitive dissonance does
not necessarily imply irrational behavior (see
Lévy-Garboua and Blondel, 2002),
• It may take arbitrarily long to remove all
cognitive dissonance (see Gawronski and Kula-
kowski, 2007),
• Living with dissonance is a resolution strat-
egy people sometimes use (see Mahaffy, 1996)
• A person may continue to maintain con-
ﬂicting attitudes and incur the costs of this ten-
sion (see Harmon-Jones et al., 2009), and
• Conﬂicting emotions may coexist, espe-
cially more in individuals who are more open to
duality (see Williams and Aaker, 2002).
We also conduct some comparative static
analyses on model parameters, which give use-
ful insights. In particular, an increase in the pace
of habituation, the discount parameter, and the
frequency of conﬂict have the same kind of
impact on long run levels of dissonances. An
increase in any of these parameters reduces the
optimal level of dissonance, increasing the ex-
pected beneﬁt from attempting cross-training.
Our model can also be interpreted in a group/
team context with interpersonal conﬂict (see
Heider, 1958; Spadafore, 1976; Cooper and
Mackie, 1983; Matz and Wood, 2005; Glasford
et al., 2008). In that context, the principal in our
model can be thought of as a manager who is
responsible for maximizing the discounted sum
of returns by allocating randomly arriving tasks
to individuals in his team or the team as a
whole. The individuals have dissonance-
inducing characteristics (e.g., different working
methods, specializations, etc.), which lead to a
fall in team performance under some circum-
stances. We theorize that our main results
would carry on to this setup, as well.
Before concluding, we want to emphasize
that our model does not aim to explain the
emergence of cognitive dissonance, but rather
takes cognitive dissonance as given and focuses
on optimal dissonance reduction behavior. Ob-
viously, explaining the emergence of cognitive
dissonance endogenously in a mathematical
framework is a promising venue for future re-
search. It is also worth mentioning that our
model framework applies more to the long-
term, persistent cognitive dissonance, whereas
short-term dissonance could be removed in re-
ality. Future research may use optimization
approach along with other mathematical tech-
niques (e.g., graph theory) to investigate disso-
nance reduction. In the context of our model,
the study of the implications of a time-
inconsistent principal and the need for cognitive
consistency in a temptation versus self-control
problems would also be fruitful. Finally, we
believe that an experimental test of the moti-
vated habituation argument is possible and
would be of interest.
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Appendix
Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
The proof directly follows from the following
facts: (i) 
i for i  1, 2 is bounded from below
by 0, (ii) Probability of receiving sj is indepen-
dent across time and equals to
1
3
for all j  1, 2,
3, (iii) P  0, and (iv) if 
i reaches 0, then it
reaches in ﬁnite number of periods with proba-
bility 1, that is, ni that satisﬁes 
i(ni)  0 is
ﬁnite with probability 1. After ﬁnitely many
periods with successful cross-training, cross-
training will not increase expected future re-
turns, after which the principal will decide in
accordance with specializations of agents.
Proof of Lemma 2
The proof follows mainly from the fact that

is are decreasing functions of successful cross-
training attempts (ni), there is no reversal in 
is,
and is are increasing functions of dissonances
(
is). Suppose that at time t, a signal sj is drawn,
which gives the principal the opportunity to
cross-train A1 (without loss of generality) and
brings an expected return P
  EVmin
j,1 ,2 in the case of cross-training. On the
other hand, acting in accordance with special-
izations brings an expected return P¯
 
EVmaxj,1,2. Because cross-training Ai is
not optimal now, P
  EVmin
t j,1 ,2 	
P¯
  EVmax
t j,1,2 should hold at t. Now
suppose that t˜ 	 t is the ﬁrst period in which the
signal sj is drawn again (which again makes cross-
training A1 a possible action). But since the cross-
training was not made at t and distribution of the
states of the world is time-independent, the dy-
namic problem of the principal at t˜ is same with
the problem at t. Therefore, it directly follows
from the inequality above that P
  EVmin
t˜
j,1 ,2	 P
  EVmaxt˜ j,1,2 holds, as well.
Proof of Theorem 1
We start with the possibility that both cogni-
tive dissonances are reduced to their minimum
values, that is, 0. Let’s call the ﬁrst period in
which 
i  0 for i  1, 2 as t0,0. By Lemma 1,
t0,0 is ﬁnite with probability 1. Starting from t0,0
onward, the principal’s decision is trivial since
cognitive dissonances cannot be reduced any-
more.10 Therefore, starting from t0,0, the princi-
pal acts in accordance with specializations for
any given signal in each period. Let’s call the
expected return from acting in accordance with
specializations starting from t0,0 onward as V

.
By the deﬁnition of t0,0, ?
i such that 
i  0 at
t0,01. Since 
i 0 at t0,0 and 
i 0 at t0,0 1,
we can say that the signal at t0,0  1 was the one
in which Ai is not specialized in. So, we can solve
the principal’s problem backward starting from

i  0, for i  1, 2. If 
i  0 is reached for both
agents, whatever decision the principal makes, the
stochastic processes in the future are same and
given the state of the world, the principal should
act in accordance with specializations since there
is no expected future beneﬁt from attempting
cross-training.
Assume that 
i reaches 0 in ni0 successful
attempts. Because the principal knows the pro-
cesses governing 
is, now when he has value of

i that is one successful cross-training away
from 0, he can compare the expected return that
corresponds to acting in accordance with spe-
cializations and attempting cross-training.
Given the parameters of the model and pro-
cesses governing 
is, the optimal decision rule
can be written as a threshold rule that is de-
scribed in the proposition.
10 Note that what we actually use here is the fact that they
are bounded below by 0, which enables us to use a back-
ward induction argument.
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Continuing in this fashion, the principal can
compare expected returns for each strategy
given the state of the world and current values
of dissonances at each period t. Therefore, each
period decision is determined with the help of a
threshold rule presented above. Since we solve
the problem in a backward induction fashion,
the collection of optimal actions along this path
constitute an optimal strategy.
Proof of Corollary 2
Attempting cross-training has expected cur-
rent costs (e.g., 
 P¯  P if sj  s1 or s2)
because the principal assigns the signal to the
agent who is not specialized in it. On the other
hand, it also has expected future beneﬁts if the
agent to be cross-trained is open to habituation,
that is, 
i(ni) is not a constant function. How-
ever, if none of the agents are open to habitua-
tion, that is, for i  1, 2, 
i(ni) is a constant
dissonance function, then there are no expected
future beneﬁts from attempting cross-training.
In this case, next period value functions in (1)
and (2) are identical for all actions at t. There-
fore, the principal’s decision is determined only
by the current expected return levels. Since in
(1), P¯  P and in (2), P¯ P¯  11 
22   P P  11  22 , the
principal does not attempt cross-training if both

is are constant. The long run levels of disso-
nances in this particular case will be the initial
values of 
1 and 
2.
Proof of Corollary 3
This case is similar to the one discussed in the
previous corollary with the only difference that
one of the agents is open to habituation. There-
fore, the reasoning used in the proofs of Prop-
osition 1 and Corollary 2 is valid again. There is
no reason to try to habituate the inﬂexible agent
and the decision on the other agent depends on
other parameters. The long run level of disso-
nance for the inﬂexible agent is its initial value
whereas for the ﬂexible agent, the decision rule
deﬁned in the main theorem combined with
parameter values determines the long run value.
Proof of Proposition 1
The frequency of the composite state affects
principal’s decision because it directly affects
the expected beneﬁt from attempting cross-
training. Fj terms are hidden in the expectation
operator in value function, (1) and (2). In par-
ticular, an increase in the probability of a con-
ﬂict means a higher marginal expected future
return for the cross-training. Accordingly, if
F˜ 3 	 F3, then 
˜
 
 i because EV˜j,˜1,˜2 
EV˜j,1,2 for cross-training. Hence, an in-
crease in the probability of s3 (i.e., F3) implies
a greater tendency for attempting cross-training.
Proof of Proposition 2
We initially assume that for all i,
i
ni
	 0 at
each point, where ni is the number of successful
cross-training attempts for agent Ai and 
i is a
function deﬁned on natural numbers. Now, as-
sume for all i,
˜ i
ni
	 0, ˜ ini  ini and,
˜ i
ni
	
i
ni
at each point ni. An increase in
habituation rate means that (i) higher (potential)
returns in the composite state (s3) will be ob-
tained sooner, that is, the cross-training invest-
ment starts to pay off sooner, and (ii) the op-
portunity cost of reaching any given level of
dissonance is now lower, both of which imply a
greater tendency for attempting cross-training.
The result follows.
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Proof of Proposition 3
The logic behind this result is very intuitive.
An increase in patience or forward-lookingness
(i.e., an increase in ) means a higher valuation
of future beneﬁts, which can be obtained by
cross-training. To show this, consider the prob-
lem of the principal at any point in time t for any
level of 
i, under signal sj which makes it pos-
sible to cross-train agent A1 (without loss of
generality). Assume that ˜ 	 . Denote the
expected future returns if cross-training is made
by EV (j, 
=1, 
2) and the expected future returns
if specializations are followed by EV (j, 
1, 
2).
As we know, if
EVj, 1 , 2EV(j, 1, 2) (P P) 

then it is optimal to attempt cross-training. But,
˜ EVj, 1 , 2EV(j, 1, 2)
EVj, 1 , 2EV(j, 1, 2) (P¯ P) 

because ˜ 	  and EV (j, 
=1, 
2)  EV (j, 
1,

2) 	 0. Because this is valid for any t, sj, and

i, it is also valid for long run values of 
i,
which implies ˜  
 i if ˜ 	 .
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